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AWAKENING BETWEEN SCIENCE, ART AND ETHICS:
VARIATIONS OF JAPANESE BUDDHIST
MODERNISM, 1890–1945
James Mark Shields
Modern Buddhism seeks to distance itself from
those forms of Buddhism that immediately
precede it and even those that are contemporary
with it. Its proponents viewed ancient Buddhism,
especially the enlightenment of the Buddha
2,500 years ago, as the most authentic moment
in the long history of Buddhism. It is also the
form of Buddhism, they would argue, that is
most compatible with the ideals of the European
Enlightenment, ideals such as reason,
empiricism, science, universalism, individualism,
tolerance, freedom, and the rejection of religious
orthodoxy. It stresses equality over hierarchy,
the universal over the local, and often exalts the
individual over the commmunity.
– Donald S. Lopez, ‘Foreword’ to Paul Carus,
The Gospel of Buddha: According to Old Records
(LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publications, 2004), p. viii
Overcoming the tradition, ‘going beyond’ it,
differing from it—these are the [Buddhist]
tradition’s own demands, not something counter
to it or outside its parameters. Simply to agree
with the tradition, to obey its current form, is
to fail to receive the ‘transmission’. It is to be
‘ungrateful’ as the Transmission of the Lamp
put it. This form of reflection can only derive
from a deep sense of historicity; it implies the
radically temporal thesis that who we are as
human beings is historical through and through.
History is conceived here not so much as a force
that acts upon our human existence but rather
as something closer at hand, something beyond
which we will not go. It is true that only a few
exceptional Buddhists were ever willing to face
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this realization in a thorough-going way. Most
preferred to apply it to things of ‘this world’ but
not of the transcendent realm of Buddhas,
nirvanas, and mind-to-mind transmission.
– Dale S. Wright, Philosophical Meditations on
Zen Buddhism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 155–156

The term modernism is notoriously difficult to pin down. In trying to
do so one often gets caught in a frustrating tautology: anything relating to modern thought, culture or practice. More specifically, modernism (sometimes Modernism) refers to a range of cultural and artistic
transformations that resulted from the changes taking place in Western
society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of
these were large-scale tendencies brought about by scientific and technological changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while
others were self-conscious attempts to create new techniques, associations and ideas that would better reflect or deal with these changes.
While the links between self-conscious modernist movements and
previous streams of Western culture—such as the Enlightenment and
Romanticism—are clear, modernists tended to see themselves and their
work as part of a break with past traditions, whether aesthetic, literary,
architectural, political, or spiritual. Ezra Pound’s motto: ‘Make it new!’
could apply to modernism as a generalized movement.
In the realm of thought, it can be said that modernists questioned
many if not all of the traditional assumptions of European cultural
heritage, including those of the mainstream religious traditions and
the Enlightenment, seen as extending from Descartes through Kant
and ending in the writings of Hegel.152 This is not to say, however, that
modernism can be easily characterized as reformist or socially
progressive—the desire to break with the immediate past, especially
the Enlightenment, sometimes resulted in a reactionary politics, as
can be seen in writings of Italian futurists such as Marinetti and in the
person of Pound.153 Moreover, the modernist reaction to science and
technology was complex: for some, machines were to be embraced as
the future of humanity, while for others—especially those more closely
152
See Pericles Lewis, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 38–39; also Peter Faulkner, Modernism (London:
Taylor & Francis, 1990), p. 60.
153
See Peter Childs, Modernism (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 17.
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linked to earlier Romantic streams—modern technology must be limited or rejected outright in favour of a more ‘aesthetic’ or introspective
approach to life’s problems.
Turning to the case of Japan, definitions of modernism are further
complicated by the simple fact that the ‘modern’ was itself a foreign
import. Thus, while one sees the same tensions as within Western
modernism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these
tensions take unique and often extreme forms. Among other things,
what emerges from a close examination of Buddhist thought in Japan
during the five decades between 1890 and 1945 is a debate between
competing visions of ‘new Buddhism’—some based on an understanding of ‘modernity’ as a historical locus with specific political and
ethical implications, and others based on a ‘modernist’ understanding
of religion as a form of ‘aesthetics’ largely abstracted from historical
circumstances. This chapter examines the various permutations of
‘Buddhist modernism’ during the period leading up to the Second
World War, as well as the implications for postwar and contemporary
Japanese Buddhism.
Meiji Restoration and Aftermath
Virtually all aspects of modern Japan were born out of the Meiji Restoration of 1868—properly not a restoration so much as ‘a complete
revolution, which affected all levels of society’.154 In what surely remains
a unique historical event, a self-appointed new government in that
year effectively invented a modern nation out of what was largely a
feudal assemblage of warring states. This invention involved not only
the centralization of authority, both literally and symbolically, in the
Emperor, but also the drive to modernize Japan—to create an industrial
and military power to rival those of the West. Among other scholars,
Nishijima Gudō (Wafu) !"#$ (%&), ‘Japanese Buddhism and the Meiji
Restoration—With an Introduction to Master Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’.
The American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, 1997. Web version: http:www.
dogensangha.org/downloads/Pdf/AAR.pdf. The Japanese term ishin '( (lit., ‘new
ties’) implies something more radical and transformative than the Engish ‘Restoration’.
Also see Robert Sharf, ‘Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited’, in Rude Awakenings:
Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism, edited by James Heisig and John
Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1994), p. 47, for more on the paradox
of modern nationalism: ‘As nationalist representations of self are inevitably constructed
in dialectical tension with the foreign ‘other’, the nationalist promise to restore cultural
‘purity’ is always necessarily empty.’
154

108

james mark shields

Najita and Harootunian note the deep and abiding ambiguity at the
heart of the Restoration, ‘between the capacity of an indigenous culture to withstand change and the claims of new knowledge demanding
transformation’.155
In the preceding Edo period, despite their sympathies with neoConfucianism, the ruling shoguns had largely adopted Buddhism as
the de facto state religion.156 Thus, some of the Meiji restorationists felt
compelled to launch a sustained critique of Buddhism as non-Japanese,
under the slogan ‘Haibutsu kishaku!’ ()*+,; lit. ‘Throw away Buddha and abolish Śākyamuni!’)157 After a short wave of severe persecution (1868-1873), during which the number of temples was reduced
from over 450,000 to approximately 70,000 and the number of Buddhists priests from 75,000 to under 20,000,158 the government generally
Najita Tetsuo and H. D. Harootunian, ‘Japan’s Revolt Against the West’, in Modern
Japanese Thought, edited by Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 208. ‘On the one hand, the Meiji restorers announced, in the
opening decree proclaiming the Restoration, that the aim of the new policy was to
return to the ‘events of antiquity and the Jimmu emperor’s state foundation.’ This meant
returning to origins, a mythical time before Japan had been corrupted by Buddhism
and Chinese civilization, and to the unalloyed practices of native experience. Yet at
the same time, the new government declared in the Charter Oath its determination to
‘search for new knowledge throughout the world’ and to ‘eliminate old customs’ ‘based
on the universal way’.’ Some bakumatsu -. (i.e. late-Edo period) intellectuals such
as Sakuma Shōzan /0123 (1811–64) had already preached the social doctrine
of tōyō dōtoku seiyō gakugei (or geijutsu) 45$6!578(89)—‘Eastern ethos
and Western technologies’. In the period leading up to the Restoration, this idea was
developed further by political activists such as Hashimoto Sanai :;<= (1831–59)
and Yokoi Shōnan >?@A (1809–69), both of whom eventually fell victim to assassination. See also Bob T. Wakabayashi, ‘Introduction’ to Modern Japanese Thought, p. 3;
Hirakawa Sukehiro BCDE, ‘Japan’s Turn to the West’, in Modern Japanese Thought,
p. 42; and Kenneth Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 106.
156
In Edo Japan, ‘religion supplied a context of ultimate meaning to the central value
system through the fact that the primary collectivities in the society—the nation and
the family—were conceived as religious as well as secular bodies. . . . Acting in closest
accord with the political values of the society, that is, giving one’s full devotion to one’s
particularistic superiors, and expressing this devotion in vigorous and continuous performance with respect to the collective goal, was seen as the best means to acquire the
approval and protection of divine beings or to attain some form of harmony with ultimate reality. It was precisely the attainment of such approval and protection of divinities
or of a state of enlightenment which was the best way to handle the basic frustrations
and anxieties of existence’ (Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of PreIndustrial Japan (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), pp. 39–40).
157
See Nishijima ‘Japanese Buddhism and the Meiji Restoration’, pp. 15–16; also
James Edward Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
158
These numbers come from Winston Davis, Japanese Religion and Society: Paradigms of Structure and Change (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 161.
155
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abandoned its zero tolerance towards Buddhism. Though outright
persecution came to an end, the growing nationalism of the period
placed increasing pressure on Buddhism to prove itself as a truly national
religion.159 Thus began a move towards what Winston Davis calls Buddhist strategies of ‘passive enablement’,160 exemplified by the so-called
kairitsu FG or ‘praxis’ movement led by Buddhist priests Fukuda
Gyōkai HIJK (1806–88), and Shaku Unshō ,LM (1827–1909).161
While it may be tempting to write off the kairitsu movement as a cynical Buddhist accommodation to political winds, it was inspired by the
recognition that one reason behind the persecution of Buddhism was
its poor public image, and that this poor public image was not wholly
undeserved.162 As such the kairitsu leaders sought to reinvigorate Buddhist values among monks and laypeople, by calling for a ‘return’ to the
ancient Buddhist precepts and monastic rules (vinaya).163
159
Buddhist leaders actively participated in whipping up nationalist sentiment
through the Great Teaching (Daikyō NO) campaign of 1871, in which 80 percent of
doctrinal instructors were Buddhist priests, and in 1889, Buddhist leaders from all of
Japan’s major sects joined to create the United Movement for Revering the Emperor and
Worshipping the Buddha (Sonnō Hōbutsu Daidōdan PQR*NST), whose intent
was ‘to preserve the prosperity of the Imperial Household and increase the power of
Buddhism. The result will be the perfection of the well-being of the Great Empire of
Japan . . . The time-honoured spiritual foundation of our empire is the Imperial Household and Buddhism’ (quoted in Brian Victoria, Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill
1997), p. 18). Also see Brian Victoria, ‘Engaged Buddhism: A Skeleton in the Closet?’
(draft manuscript received from the author, 2001), p. 19; Brian Victoria, ‘When God(s)
and Buddhas Go to War’ (draft manuscript received from the author, 2002), p. 8.
160
See Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 160 (also ch. 4, passim.)
161
Who were inspired in turn by the earlier bakumatsu figure Jiun Sonja Onkō UL
PVWX (1718–1804). ‘To protect the Dharma, these priests elaborated a conservative
strategy based on a reaffirmation of the religion’s loyalty to the throne.’ Various slogans
proclaimed that the Dharma was virtually coextensive with the law of the land. Buddhist
leaders argued that Buddhism was ‘useful’ (buppō kokueki [*YZ[]) because it could
magically and morally ‘protect’ the nation (gohō gokoku [\Y]Z]). From this they
reasoned that the state, in turn, should protect Buddhism by reestablishing it as an official religion (goyō shūkyō [\^_O])’ (Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 162).
162
Though, as Orion Klautau points out in a recent article, the Meiji ‘discourse on Edoperiod Buddhist decadence’ was infested with ideological aspects. See Orion Klautau,
‘Against the Ghosts of Recent Past: Meiji Scholarship and the Discourse of Edo Period
Buddhist Decadence’, Japanese Journal of Religious Stuides, 35, 2 (2008), pp. 263–303.
163
Certainly, there is a reactionary—even fundamentalist—aspect to this moral reformation; e.g. in Sōen’s insistence that the sacred esoteric Mount Kōya remain off limits
to women. At the same time, unlike most fundamentalists, they also evoked the longstanding Japanese ideal of sectarian and inter-religious harmony, ‘calling for a restoration of the syncretistic ties they traditionally had enjoyed with Shinto and Confucianism’
(Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 162). While Davis’s argument, that this ‘return’
to basic Buddhist values also provided a ‘plausibility structure’ by which the persecution
of Buddhism could be rationalized and understood, has merit, it need not be taken as the
primary motivation behind the desire for Buddhist reform among the kairitsu masters.
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The Buddhist Enlightenment: Visions of Buddhist ‘Modernity’

While the impact of these Buddhist ‘restorationists’ cannot be denied,
theirs were the voices of a passing generation, which would soon be
drowned out by those of a ‘new generation’164 of Buddhist scholars who
would actively seek to remake Buddhism for the modern age. These
thinkers modelled themselves less on their kairitsu co-religionists than
on the secular ‘Civilization and Enlightenment Movement’ (bunmei
kaika `abc). Taking its name from a term coined by Fukuzawa
Yukichi Hdef (1835–1901), the Civilization and Enlightenment
Movement promoted the benefits of Western learning for Japanese
civilization.165 Some members of this group—and within early Meiji
intellectual circles more broadly—were convinced that the West’s technological and economic strength was based on its moral and spiritual
traditions, and that Japan required Christianity if it hoped to advance.166
Others like Fukuzawa took a view on religion that can be considered
‘rationalist’, ‘Frazerian’ or even ‘neo-Confucian’: all religions, including
Christianity and Buddhism, were mere stepping-stones towards the
higher wisdom found in science and philosophy.
Faced with this challenge, thinkers of the so-called Buddhist Enlightenment—including Hara Tanzan gh3 (1819–1892), Shimaji Mokurai ijkl (1838–1911), Murakami Senshō mnop (1851–1929),
Inoue Enryō ?nqr (1858–1919), Shaku Sōen s_t (1859–1919),
and Kiyozawa Manshi udvw(1863–1903)—attempted in various
ways to ‘modernize’ (as well as spread) the Dharma.167 Though the
164
The phrase comes from Kenneth Pyle, New Generation, and is also employed by
Katheen Staggs in ‘‘Defend the Nation and Love the Truth’. Inoue Enryo and the Revival
of Meiji Buddhism’, Monumenta Nipponica 38, 3 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 251–281.
165
The ideas of the bunmei kaika found expression in the Meiji Six magazine
(Meiroku zasshi axyz) published by a group that called itself the Meiji Six Society
(Meirokusha ax{)—many of whom were members of the new Meiji government.
This group held regular meetings, at which they would discuss all manner of issues
related to modern lilfe: human rights, the role of women, the role of scholars in society,
economic and political issues, as well as matters of ethics and religion. Though the Press
Ordinance and Libel Laws passed in 1875 silenced the group’s organ, they continued to
meet until the 1890s.
166
This faction was represented by Nakamura Masano|m}~ (1834–1891). Best
known for his 1871 translation of Samuel Smiles’s Self-Help, Nakamura became an
influential member of the Meiji Six Society and converted to Christianity in 1874.
167
Others included Katō Kurō •€•‚ (1830–90), Ōsu Tetsunen Nƒ„…
(1834–1902), Akamatsu Renjo †‡ˆ‰ (1841–1919), and Ishikawa Shuntai ŠC‹
Œ (1842–1931). With the exception of Hara Tanzan, the Sōtō Zen priest and scholar
who was the first to establish the academic study of Buddhism at Tokyo Imperial
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social and political conclusions of these figures ranged from mildly liberal to solidly conservative and even, in some cases, quasi-imperialist,
they present an important bridge to the more progressive New Buddhists as well as the Kyoto School thinkers of succeeding generations.
In short, while these Buddhist Enlightenment thinkers may have found
inspiration for ‘reform’ in the kairitsu movement of the previous generation, they also attempted to ‘modernize’ the Dharma in line with
many of the principles espoused by the bunmei kaika—without, however, going so far as to renounce Buddhism in favour of Christianity
or secular philosophy.168 While they were certainly ‘modernizers’, they
were not necessarily ‘modernists’ in the sense outlined above.
As Western culture and values, including models and methods of
Western scholarship on religion, began to make themselves felt in the
mid- to late-Meiji period, it was inevitable that such would lead some
Buddhist scholars towards a demythologized,169 rational, ethical and
historicist understanding of Buddhism.170 Though it can hardly be considered a school or movement in its own right, theories of scholars who
University and Shaku Sōen, a Rinzai Zen priest and Buddhist ‘missionary’ to the West,
the entirety of these names are connected in some fashion to the Meiji Shin Buddhist
Ōtani-ha ‘reform’ movement. For more on Hara, see Sueki Fumihiko .•`Ž•,
‘Building a Platform for Academic Buddhist Studies: Murakami Senshō’, translated by
James Mark Shields, Eastern Buddhist, New Series 36, 1, 2005. Davis presents a mixed
review of the Buddhist Enlightenment, suggesting that, while ‘they deserve respect for
their attempts, however feeble, to make sense of their own religious tradition in light of
the western scientific and philosophical thought inundating Japan at the time . . . they
tended to be critical of society itself but not of political absolutism’, and thus cannot be
called truly progressive (Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 164).
185
Though, as Snodgrass notes, in 1881 Fukuzawa would soften his stance, calling on all
Buddhist priests ‘amenable to reason’ to defend their faith from attacks. Judith Snodgrass,
Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the
Columbian Exposition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 139.
169
This drive towardss demythologization of a religious tradition finds a parallel in
Western scholarship on religion of the same period, particularly the drive towardss
uncovering the ‘historical Jesus’, as well as the slightly later work of German theologian Rudolf Bültmann. As with such Western Christian scholars, the scholars of Daijō
hibussetsuron were generally working to preserve some pure essence of their tradition by opening the gates to historical critical method, in the sincere belief that science could provide religious answers that mythology and even centuries of doctrinal
development could not. It is important to note the fact that, in both cases, there was a
distinctly ‘theological’ undercurrent at work.
170
Parts of the following section on Murakami Senshō have been taken from my
article ‘Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought:
Murakami Senshō and Critical Buddhism’, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series 37: 1–2
(2005), pp. 106–134. Thanks to the The Eastern Buddhist for permission to reprint this
material. See this essay for more on Murakami and his anticipation of some features of
the contemporary Critical Buddhist (hihan bukkyō) movement.
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adopted such tendencies came to be known, often derisively, as Daijō
hibussetsuron N•‘*’“, which may be literally translated as the
‘theory that the Mahāyāna teachings are not true Buddhism’. The term
was applied to the writings of several Buddhist scholars beginning in
the 1890s such as Murakami Senshō and Anesaki Masaharu ”•}
– (1873–1949), the latter of whom would eventually, and perhaps not
incidentally, be appointed as first professor of Religious Studies at Tokyo
Imperial University in 1905. Inspired by Western scholarly notions of
empiricism and scientific method, Daijō hibussetsuron sought to clarify
and demarcate the limits of what should be included under the rubric
‘Buddhism’. In short, they combined a scholarly methodology with an
unmistakably normative—and even ‘sectarian’, though in a very broad
sense—agenda. The conclusion of Daijō hibussetsuron was that that the
so-called Great Vehicle was a repository for supernaturalism, mysticism,
deformities or corruptions of the original, pure teachings, better preserved in the early ‘Hinayana’ and latter-day Theravāda streams of southeast Asia. Controversy of course ensued, most of the criticism coming,
unsurprisingly, from the Buddhist establishment, those still-powerful
institutions understandably reluctant to serve up their longstanding
beliefs on the altar of modern (and Western inspired) sensibilities.171
Though often associated with Daijō hibussetsuron, the work of
Murakami Senshō provides a good example of some of the ambiguities
and complexities of Buddhist Enlightenment modernism. In his magnum opus, Bukkyō tōitsuron *O—˜“ (On the Unification of Buddhism), Murakami attempted to employ the tools of modern critical
171
It is also important to note that the most important precedent for Daijō hibussetsuron within Japan are the controversial writings of Edo period scholar Tominaga
Nakamoto ™š›œ (1715–1746). Tominaga may well have been the first writer
‘systematically to question the assumption that the Mahāyāna sūtras, or indeed others, were transmitted directly from the [historical] Buddha’. Moreover, without, once
again, the benefit of Western learning, Tominaga came to this conclusion by ‘the critical, historical method of juxtaposing innumerable variations in the various texts and
illustrating how these arose in order for some point to be made over against another
school’. Tominaga’s work raised a strong challenge to the authority claims of the various
Mahāyāna sects, a challenge hardly mitigated by the aggressive and sometimes derisive
tone he took towardss those who ‘vainly say that all the teachings came directly from
the golden mouth of the Buddha’ (Tominaga Nakamoto, Emerging from Meditation,
translated by Micahel Pye (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), pp. 4-5. Perhaps not
incidentally, Tominaga may have also been the first scholar in Japan to employ the term
shūkyō _O in a sense that approximates its modern usage (Tominaga, Emerging from
Meditation, p. 122). As Ian Reader has pointed out, this flies in the face of the assumptions of scholars such as Tim Fitzgerald, who insist that the concept of religion is simply
a cultural borrowing (or imposition) from the West (see Reader 2004: 9).
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scholarship to discern a clear historical and doctrinal foundation for
Buddhism. The result is at once an original, impressive, and yet deeply
flawed piece of Buddhist scholarship—a ‘gorgeous failure’172 whose
grand aspiration to bring about a ‘scheme for the amalgamation of all
Buddhist sects’ was bound to end in disappointment.173 Written in fits
and starts over a period of more than twenty years,174 its argument is,
on the face of it, quite simple: Buddhism can and should be unified,
because, whether Buddhists themselves recognize it or not, underlying all the manifold teachings (kyōsō O•) is a common, fundamental
essence of doctrine (kyōri Ož), which provides not only the historical
trunk but also the life-giving sap of the great Buddhist tree.175
In reading Bukkyō tōitsuron, however, it becomes clear that while
Murakami was a self-consciously modern scholar dedicated to rigorous historical scholarship, he was not so quick to follow the Daijō
hibussetsuron path of complete demythologization—he clearly states
his commitment to uncovering not only the bare facts of Buddhist
history, but also to the more elusive religious or doctrinal dimensions
172
Sueki Fumihiko clearly outlines the main failings of Murakami’s scholarship, not
least of which are his complete lack of Sanskrit and dismissal of Western scholarly conclusions on Buddhism. See Sueki, ‘Building a Platform’).
173
As Murakami himself, by the time of writing the final chapter on ‘Practice’ (1927),
came to acknowledge: ‘At the time of its first publication, theoretically and also practically,
there was a possibility of Buddhist unity, as well as the thought that such was necessary.’
However, after this time, he could not help but acknowledge that while, ‘the theoretical
possibility remained, the practical possibility did not’. This seems to contradict or at least
problematize his earlier admission that the unification he sought was not to be taken at
the ‘formal’ level. In any case, Sueki argues, correctly, I think, that the failure of Unification has as much if not more to do with inherent problems in Murakami’s approach as it
does with changing social and religious circumstances. (See Sueki, ‘Building a Platform’.)
there was a possibility of Buddhist unity, as well as the thought that such was necessary.’
However, after this time, he could not help but acknowledge that while, ‘the theoretical
possibility remained, the practical possibility did not’. This seems to contradict or at least
problematize his earlier admission that the unification he sought was not to be taken at
the ‘formal’ level. In any case, Sueki argues, correctly, I think, that the failure of Unification has as much if not more to do with inherent problems in Murakami’s approach as it
does with changing social and religious circumstances. (See Sueki, ‘Building a Platform’.)
174
Successive volumes were published in 1901, 1903, 1905 and 1927.
175
Murakami Senshō, Bukkyō tōitsuron *O—˜“ (On the Unification of Buddhism), edited by Ōta Yoshimaru (Tokyo: Gunsho, 1997 [1922]), p. 10. Murakami’s use
of kyōsō, is of course related to the traditional, particularly Mahāyāna Buddhist teaching of upāya kauśalya (Jp. hōben Ÿ )—expedient means or ‘beneficent deception’—
used especially by Chinese Buddhists ‘to help deal with the hermeneutical problem of
reconciling the disparities among the different teachings attributed to the Buddha—to
explain that the differences in the teachings of the Buddha delivered in his forty-nine
year ministry were the result of the different audiences he addressed’ (Charles Muller,
Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, ‘upāya kauśalya’).
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that bind Buddhists of all stripes together. In other words, Murakami
employs what he refers to elsewhere as a ‘Buddhistic’ (Bukkyō shugi *
O¡¢) approach to history. He concludes that while faith should not
be completely irrational, it does and must come into play.176 At the same
time, although Murakami’s commitment to historical studies appears
to weaken over the decades, it never entirely disappears, and serves
to keep him apart from the growing trend towards the ahistorical,
existential brand of modernist Buddhism developed in the early and
mid-twentieth century by D. T. Suzuki, the Kyoto School, and continued by many postwar Western Buddhist popularizers. Before turning
to this alternative form of modernism, however, let us examine several
movements dedicated to reforming Buddhism along lines of humanism
and social reform.
Warp and Woof: The Birth of New Buddhism
In 1894, twenty-three year old Furukawa Isamu (Rōsen) £¤¥(¦
C) (1871–1899) founded the Warp and Woof Society (Keiikai §¨
©), dedicated to Buddhist reform. The members of Warp and Woof
were harshly critical of the existing Buddhist establishment, and made
it their mission to show that, contra neo-Confucian claims, Buddhism
was not—or did not have to be—a superstitious and otherworldly religion. In particular, they followed the lead of Buddhist Enlightenment
figure Inoue Enryō in rejecting so-called ‘magical Buddhism’ (kitō
bukkyō ª«*O) in favour of a Buddhism that was humanistic, progressive, and this-worldly in focus. Warp and Woof was based on two
central principles: ‘free investigation’ (jiyū tōkyū ¬-®¯) and ‘progressive reform’ (shinshū (°). At the same time, the society also had
a messianic aspect. According to their manifesto: ‘This Association is
a union of those who believe in Buddhism as the highest and greatest
religion and who want to propagate Buddhism and universally spread
176
‘As a rule, are there not two main forms to what is referred to as religious faith?
One, which does not require an appeal to common sense, is belief beyond or outside
anything rational, while the other is faith obtained through approval of an appeal to
reason or common sense. In these two types of faith, the first cannot help but block
the advance of society and progress, while the second cannot help but accompany
social progress. In our humble opinion, the function of training based on a rejection of
the irrational, and adjudication in terms of common sense, is all the more important
among the present generation of thinkers’ (Murakami, Bukkyō tōitsuron, p. 464, my
translation; also see Sueki Fumihiko, Meiji shisō-ka ron—Kindai Nihon no shisō: Saikō
I a–±²³“—´µ¶;·±²¸¹ºI (Tokyo: Transview Press), p. 21).
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its blessings to all humanity.’
Furukawa was the leading light in Warp and Woof. During a decade
characterized by a series of incidents related to the so-called Conflict
between Religion and Education (kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu O»¼
_O·½¾) the majority of Buddhist leaders and scholars—including
some associated with the ‘Buddhist Enlightenment’—had joined their
voices to the chorus of anti-Christian and anti-foreign rhetoric. In contrast, Furukawa’s writings present a decidedly impartial appraisal of the
current problems and crises facing modern Japan and Buddhism. In
1894, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, Furukawa published an article entitled ‘Entering an Age of Doubt’ (Kaigi no jidai ni haireri ¿À·
ÁµÂÃÄÅ) in which he proclaimed the birth of a ‘new Buddhism’
(shin bukkyō (*O),177 though the seeds of his ideas can be found in a
1892 essay simply entitled ‘On Buddhism’ (Bukkyō-ron *O“).178 All
philosophies and religions, according to Furukawa, go through three
stages: dogmatism (dokudan ÆT), doubt or scepticism (kaigi ¿À),
and criticism (hihyō ÇÈ). While Christianity has passed through its
age of doubt and entered an age of criticism, Buddhism was only just
emerging from dogmatism and entering into a period of doubt and
scepticism. Unless Buddhism passes through what might be called this

177
Three years earlier, in a piece entitled ‘Nijūyon-nen igo no nidai kyōto ÉÊËÌ
ÍÎ·ÉNOÏ’ [Adherents of Two Faiths: 1891 and Beyond], published in the journal Hansei zasshi ÐÑyz, Furukawa noted that, although Buddhism was superior to
Christianity in terms of its ‘truths’, it lagged behind its Western rival when it came to
social concerns, having over its long history become enmeshed in rituals, superstitions,
regulations and fallen prey to general irrationality. For these reasons, reform—directed
in particular towardss social engagement—had become necessary. At this point, Furukawa’s ideas were still largely derivative of Enlightenment figures such as Nakanishi
Ushio |!Ò‚ (1859–1930). See Yoshinaga Shin’ichi fšÓ˜, ‘Furukawa Rosen no
bukkyōron’, Panel on The Discursive Space of ‘New Buddhism’ and its Meaning in the
History of Religion and Culture, Proceedings of the 67th Annual Convention of the
Japanese Association for Religious Studies, Shukyō kenkyū 82, 4, 2009, p. 1041.
178
Published in the journal Bukkyō ÔO. Here Furukawa also expresses his conviction that scholarship must persist, even if such leads to a crisis of personal faith—a
belief shared by the DJHB scholars as well as their contemporary Western counterparts
in the so-called Religionswissenschaft movement. See Yoshinaga ‘Furukawa Rosen’,
p. 1041; also see Max Müller’s remarks about the ‘scientific’ study of religion, which
inevitably ‘entails losses, and losses of many things which we hold dear. But this I will
say, that, as far as my humble judgement goes, it does not entail the loss of anything that
is essential to true religion, and that if we strike the balance honestly, the gain is immeasurably greater than the loss’ (F. Max Müller Introduction to the Science of Religion:
Four Lectures Delivered at the Royal Institution with Two Essays of False Analogies,
and the Philosophy of Mythology (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1873),
pp. 9–10).
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cleansing period, it will not be able to enter into its perfected, critical
stage.179
At the same time, this emphasis on a ‘scientific’ approach to the study
of religion held a concomitant danger of losing sight of the practical and
this-worldly aspects of Buddhism that Furukawa and other ‘new Buddhists’ wished to promote. In an article entitled ‘The Practical Direction of New Buddhists’ (Shin Bukkyō-to no jissaiteki hōmen (*O
Ï·ÕÖ×ŸØ) published in the journal Bukkyō in 1893, Sugimura
Jūō argued that an emphasis on ‘scientific Buddhism’ (gakuri jūshi no
bukkyō-ron 7žÙÚ·*O“) should not take precedence over a
Buddhism committed to ‘social activism’ (shakai-teki katsudō {©×
ÛÜ). In similar fashion, Furukawa, while mindful of the importance
of a ‘scientific’ approach to Buddhism, emphasized the priority of lived
experience (keiken §Ý) to theory (riron ž“).180
Although Warp and Woof disbanded in 1899 upon the untimely
death of Furukawa, their torch was soon passed to a new group calling themselves the New Buddhist Fellowship.181 This group consisted
of a dozen or so young scholars and activists including Sakaino Satoru
(Kōyō) Þßà (á5) (1871–1933), Watanabe Kaikyoku âãäå
Here we might note the similarities between Furukawa’s stance and that of Paul
Carus (1852–1919), the German-American writer who was simultaneously formulating
a ‘modernist’ interpretation of Buddhism that would be enormously influential in both
Asia and the West. Though best known for his Gospel of Buddha (1894), Carus published
a work entitled Science: A Religious Revelation in 1893—the year of the Columbian
Exposition—in which he expressed his conviction that ‘science’ was a necessary scourge
of orthodox religious belief, and yet the final result would be not irreligious materialism
but rather a higher ‘religion of science’ (see Martin Verhoeven, ‘From Crisis to Conversion: The Religion of Science’, in Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddhism: According to Old
Records (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publications), p. 8). In 1899, the year of Furukawa’s
death, Carus wrote the following paean to science as harbinger of true religion: ‘There is
no peace of soul for him whose religion has not passed through the furnace of scientific
criticism, where it is cleansed of all the slag and dross of paganism. If God ever spoke
to man, science is the burning bush; and if there is any light by which man can hope to
illuminate his path so as to make firm steps, it is the light of science . . . for science is holy,
and the light of science is the dwelling place of God’ (quoted in Richard Hughes Seager,
ed., The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from the World’s Parliament of Religions,
1893 [LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publications, 1993], p. 72).
180
See Yoshinaga, ‘Furukawa Rosen’, p. 1041.
181
Although New Buddhism is a term that is sometimes applied to the broad sweep
of reform movements in Buddhist thought and practice from the 1870s, the term shin
bukkyō refers more specifically to a short-lived movement of the late 1890s and early
1900s. Founded in 1899 as Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai ÔOuÏSæç (Buddhist Youth
Fellowship), the group changed its name to Shin Bukkyō Dōshikai (ÔOSæç (New
Buddhist Fellowship) in 1903. The New Buddhists were all in their mid- to late twenties,
from similar middle-class backgrounds, and were largely unaffiliated with a particular
sect. Their youth gave a spirit of freshness—as well as cheekiness—to their writings.
179
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(1872–1933), Sugimura Kōtarō (Jūō; Sojinkan) èméê‚ (ë>; ì
íî) (1872–1945), Katō Kumatarō (Totsudō; Genchi) •€ïê‚
(ðñ; òó) (1873–1965), and Takashima En (Beihō) ô"q (õö)
(1875–1949).182 Like the Warp and Woof Society, the New Buddhists
were critical of the ‘old Buddhism’, which they believed had been complicit in the conservative forces that had thus far inhibited ‘progress’ in
Japan—particularly in the areas of education and ethics.183 In July 1900,
a magazine entitled ‘New Buddhism’ was launched as the movement’s
mouthpiece. Here could be found their Statement of General Principles
(kōryō ÷ø), summarized in the following six points:
1. In our view, Buddhism is fundamentally a faith based in morality.
2. We will work hard to foster sound religious beliefs, knowledge, and moral principles in order to bring about fundamental
improvements to society.
3. We advocate the free investigation of Buddhism in addition to
other religions.
4. We resolve to destroy superstition.
5. We do not accept the necessity of preserving traditional religious
institutions and rituals.
6. We believe the government should refrain from favouring religious groups or interfering in religious matters.184
Despite the increasing dangers, New Buddhists engaged in mild forms
of social activism, by protesting, for example, the government’s actions
during the Tetsugakkan Affair (Tetsugakkan jiken à7ùúû) of 1902
and the publication of the Ministry of Education’s Order Number One
(Kunrei Ichigo üý˜þ) in 1906. They also expressed criticism of
neo-Confucianism, bushidō, the Boshin Imperial Rescript (Boshin
Shōsho ÿ!"#) of 1908, as well as the state-sponsored Hōtoku $
6 and the National Morality (kokumin dōtoku Z%$6) movements.
182
Other members were: Hayashi Takejirō (Kokei; Bakuan) &'–‚ (£(; )
*) (1871–1941), Tanaka Jiroku (Gakan) I|–x (+,), Andō Hiroshi -€E,
Kawamura Jūnirō (Gohō) CmÊÉ‚ (.ö), Ito Sachio /€<0&, Kimura Teitarō
(Daisetsu) •m1ê‚ (N2) and Dōyū Gen $3ò.
183
Like many of their conservative peers, they also promoted abstinence, non-smoking,
and an end to prostitution.
184
See Shin Bukkyō (ÔO 1, 1, 1900, my translation. As the final point above
shows, unlike some ‘reformers’ of the day, they were not looking for government support of Buddhism—in fact, they were highly critical of any government involvement
in religious matters. This was based on their analysis of Buddhism during the late Edo
and early Meiji periods, which, in their estimation, had become corrupted by state
support—and compliance with the ‘Tennō system’ (tennōsei 456) in particular.
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Some members openly expressed ‘war weariness’ at the time of the
Russo-Japanese War, though only one—Takashima Beihō—went so far
as to publicly oppose the war.185 As a result, their magazine was forcibly
shut down several times during its brief existence.
In making the case that Buddhists—and Japanese more generally—
owed a debt of gratitude to ‘all sentient beings’ (shuyō-on 789),
interpreted here to mean ‘society’, the New Buddhists attempted to
combine traditional Buddhist teachings and Confucian concepts of
debt (on) and gratitude with the emerging constitutional language of
the day. In turn, it was the role of the sovereign or state to preserve
the political order (kengi :¢). As such, they distinguished themselves
from conservative factions, both religious and political, that emphasized the necessity of returning gratitude via complete submission to
the Emperor, state or ‘national body’ (kokutai Z;). In fact, following
Winston Davis, the New Buddhists were at the forefront of what can be
called ‘the Buddhist discovery of society’.186
In a piece entitled ‘Reply to Dr Kato’, Sakaino embraces the ‘new’
aspect of New Buddhism, while rejecting the notion that the movement
is simply a form of Buddhist ‘liberalism’.187 New Buddhism is based
on a return to foundational Buddhist principles, but is also that such
a return will involve a certain measure of ‘reform’ (kairyō <=) and
‘making new’ (arata ni suru (Â>?) As such, New Buddhists see no
problem in calling their movement ‘new’.188 But what, Sakaino goes on
to ask, is it that lies at the foundation of Buddhism? His answer, rather
suprisingly, is a ‘pantheistic worldview’ (hanshinron-teki sekai-kan @
A“×BC,)—by which he means something like a (Shinto?) recognition of the ‘sacred’ quality in all things.189
With regard to the question of how Buddhism relates to other forms
of religion and scholarship, New Buddhists contend that Buddhism
must invariably support a broad-minded and tolerant perspective.
Indeed, Sakaino suggests that it is ‘a matter of course’ that Buddhism
should engage and even adopt principles from other religions and
See Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 168.
Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 179
187
Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 383
188
Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 383
189
‘We New Buddhists wish to establish Buddhism on the basis of a pantheistic
worldview. A pantheistic perspective shall be the foundation of Buddhism. Upon this
foundation, the Buddhism of the future can be continuously improved and purified.
This is what we are calling New Buddhism’ (Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 384, my translation).
185
186
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scholarship, if these can provide surer support to Buddhism.190 Moreover, ‘just as historical Buddhism was transformed by the thought of
various periods, so too must the many sects and schools in existence
today be transformed by contemporary thought’.191 Thus, while it is true
that New Buddhists look towards the ‘original’ foundations of Buddhism as a source—in the assurance that Buddhism holds the most profound ‘truth’—they also recognize that a number of ‘evil practices’ have
arisen throughout Buddhist history, leading to a condition in which
contemporary Buddhism has become ‘unsatisfactory’.192
A major criticism faced by the New Buddhists—and one raised by
several members themselves in the pages of The New Buddhist—was that
they had let social and political concerns overtake ‘spiritual’ ones, and thus
had effectively removed themselves from mainsteam Buddhist tradition.
Indeed, some critics such as Buddhist scholar Ōuchi Seiran N=DE
(1845–1918) questioned whether they could even call themselves ‘Buddhist’ at all, given that they had failed to produce a ‘new faith’? Of course,
such criticisms raise numerous complex questions about the definition of
‘religion’ versus ‘politics’ or ‘ethics’.193 It is fair to say that the New Buddhists,
along with their Warp and Woof predecessors, shared the conviction that
their ‘new faith’ was intrinsically connected with social concerns.’194
Nishida’s Pure Experience and the Origins of Zen Modernism
This final section will focus on several key themes in the writings of
Nishida Kitarō !IFG‚ (1870–1945), founder of the Kyoto School
(Kyōto gakuha HI7J), the most prominent philosophical school of
twentieth-century Japan. Though not affiliated or grounded in religion per
Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 384
Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 384
192
Shin Bukkyō 2, 9, p. 384
193
These questions remain as complex today as a century ago, as we can see in the
following remark by Winston Davis: ‘Nevertheless, the New Buddhists would not have
recognized a purely secular salvation as enlightenment, or an enlightenment without
the spirit of emptiness, self-control and non-ego as salvation’ (Davis, Japanese Religion
and Society, p. 170). What, we are compelled to ask, does Davis mean by ‘purely secular
salvation’ or ‘the spirit of emptiness’?
194
Though, as Davis notes, while some New Buddhists ‘tried to move towardss the
workers, like other ‘bourgeois intellectuals’, their sympathies usually stopped short of
direct political action (Davis, Japanese Religion and Society, p. 170). This turn was
left to more radical movements such as the ‘Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism’
(Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei (K*ODÌSL), led by Nichiren Buddhist layman
Senō Girō (1889–1961).
190
191
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se, the philosophy developed by Nishida and his main successors, including Tanabe Hajime IãM (1885–1962) and Nishitani Keiji !NO–
(1900–1990), was deeply indebted to Buddhist and Zen thought in particular. Moreover, their work reflects a different flavour of modernism—one
distinguished by a turn away from the lure of science and historical scholarship and towards an existential and aesthetic interpretation of religion.
In Nishida’s earliest work, the groundbreaking Zen no kenkyū P·
Q¯R(An Inquiry into the Good, 1911), he introduces his fundamental
concept of ‘pure experience’ (junsui keiken ST§Ý).195 For Nishida:
To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance
with facts by completely relinquishing one’s own fabrications. What we
usually refer to as experience is adulterated with some sort of thought,
so by pure I am referring to experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination. . . . In this regard, pure experience is
identical with direct experience. When one experiences one’s own state of
consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its
object are completely unified. This is the most refined type of experience.196
195
As many scholars have noted, contemporary Western thinkers such as William
James and Josiah Royce (1855–1916) deeply influenced Nishida’s Inquiry into the
Good. James had discussed the root of all experience in terms of an ‘instantaneous
field of present’ in which all experience is ‘pure’,and noted that: ‘It is as if there were in
the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call “something there”, more deep and more general than any
of the particular “senses” by which current psychology supposes existent realities to
be originally revealed.’ See William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York
and Boston: Longmans and Green, 1912), pp. 23–24; and The Varieties of Religious
Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 55. And yet, despite
the reliance on James, in some respects Nishida’s Inquiry into the Good brought an
end to the direct and often uncritical import of Western philosophy characteristic of
the Meiji period and prompted the beginnings of a genuine Japanese philosophy. During the later period of his life, Nishida openly acknowledged that his Inquiry into the
Good was too psychological and mystical: ‘As I look at it now, the standpoint of this
book is that of consciousness, and it might be thought of as a kind of psychologism.’
These remarks can be found in a preface to the 1936 edition entitled ‘Upon Resetting
the Type’. See Abe Masao UV}W, ‘Introduction’ to Nishida Kitarō, An Inquiry into
the Good, translated by Abe Masao and Christopher A. Ives (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1987), pp. vii–xxviii. Also see David A. Dilworth, ‘Introduction’
to Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, Nishida
Kitarō. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press), p. 18; and Jacynthe Tremblay, Nishida
Kitaro: Le Jeu De L’individuel Et De L’universel (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2000), pp.
14–15, for a discussion of the various periods of Nishida’s life and thought.
196
Nishida Kitarō, An Inquiry into the Good, translated by Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 3–4. One might, again, refer
here to an aesthetic way. ‘Artistic experiences are often ‘pre-conceptual’ in the sense that
they are not mastered by a conceptualizing intellect. In a way, these experiences give
the impression of unfolding themselves ‘all alone’, that is of taking place without any
conscious effort from the part of the subject.’ See Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Place and
Dream: Japan and the Virtual (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2004), p. 11.
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Moreover, against Immanuel Kant as well as the New Buddhists,
Nishida contends that ‘religion does not gain adequate definition from
the moral standpoint. The religious form of life does not even arise
from that standpoint. Even if such a thing were to be imagined, it would
not be true religion.’197 Religious experience, says Nishida, is not about
‘ethical progression’ of any sort, but it is grounded in the realization of
the problematic nature of one’s very existence. In short, Nishida conceives of religion as the ultimate ‘transvaluation’ of morality. ‘To speak
of religion in moral terms’, he concludes, ‘is to set up social existence as
the basis of the self ’s own existential condition.’198
Although he never abandoned the idea, in his later writings Nishida
turned away from speaking of pure experience, replacing such with a
more nuanced and, in his understanding, more clearly Buddhist concept
of basho XY—usually translated as topos, locus or ‘place’.199 Yet, extending
through all works is the conviction that ‘the religious horizon of concrete
immediacy is the deepest a priori of the self, underlying the a priori of cognitive intellect, moral will, and aesthetic feeling’.200 In Nishida’s final writings, the ‘logic of place,’ along with the philosophy of ‘active intuition’, come
to be more closely related to ethics and political behaviour.201 ‘Religiously
Nishida Kitarō, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, translated by David A. Dilworth (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1987), p. 82. In
these words one hears echoes of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), particularly his three
‘stages on life’s way’: aesthetic, ethical, religious—except that in Nishida’s conception,
the aesthetic realm is indistinguishable from the religious.
198
Robert Carter, summing up Nishida’s critique of Kant, says ‘Clearly, the ultimate
goal of Buddhism, and of Zen, is not morality, but spirituality’ (Robert E. Carter, The
Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō, 2nd
edition (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1997), p. 129.
199
In the 1920s Nishida developed his ideas of basho along lines borrowed from
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the neo-Kantians and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814),
and placed emphasis in particular on pure feeling as the basic condition or ground for ‘true
subjectivity’ and as ‘a more profound level of consciousness than intellectual cognition’. His
final works written in the period leading up to and through the Pacific War (1930–45), deal
more extensively with basho vis-à-vis ‘the world of action’ and historical reality. See Tremblay, Nishida Kitaro, p. 16, n. 5. As Dilworth notes, Nishida’s ‘nine successive volumes of
purely philosophical writing during 1911 and his death in 1945 were a continuous process
of articulation of a central insight concerning ‘the immediacy of experience’ in Buddhistic terms’. See David A. Dilworth, ‘Nishida Kitarō: Nothingness as the Negative Space of
Experiential Immediacy’, International Philosophical Quarterly 13, 4, 1973, p. 463. Here,
Dilworth refers to the series of volumes, eleven in total, published between 1911 and 1945.
Nishida’s complete works in nineteen volumes were published by Iwanami Shoten in 1965.
200
Dilworth, ‘Nishida Kitarō’, pp. 469–471.
201
This late turn has been called Nishida’s Kehre from a philosophy of self-consciousness
to one of history-politics, possibly as a response to the writings of his erstwhile disciple
Tanabe Hajime. See Huh Woo-Sung, ‘The Philosophy of History in the ‘Later’ Nishida: A
Philosophic Turn’, Philosophy East and West 40, 3, 1990, pp. 343–374.
197
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awakened people’, writes Nishida, ‘become “master of every situation” as
the self-determination of the absolute present. In all respects these people
are active. For each, “the place in which one stands is truth” . . . From a true
religious awakening one can submit to the state.’202
Ironically, in his attempt to give a more concrete and socio-historical
understanding of basho, Nishida ends up creating a highly abstract and
de-historicized ideological basis for the imperialist vision of the day. As
Christopher Ives puts it, ‘Nishida helped provide a philosophical foundation for the ‘holy war’ being waged in the name of the emperor.’203 Indeed, a
major critique of Kyoto School philosophy—and Nishida’s pure experience
and logic of place in particular—is the tendency towards a dehistoricized
noetic ground for awareness and subjectivity which ‘makes it impossible
in the end to consider the “contradictions” of this world as tragic contradictions; it slants one in the direction of esthetic contemplation’.204 In
speaking of Nishida’s later move towards understanding basho in light of
absolute nothingness, Jan van Bragt argues that it ‘seems to wipe away
every imperfection of actual human life by proclaiming a higher standard
from which all such things are seen to be non-existent or illusory’.205
202
Quoted in Christopher Ives, ‘Ethical Pitfalls in Imperial Zen and Nishida Philosophy: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique’, in Rude Awakenings, p. 23. This idea is repeated in an
essay written in 1944: ‘True obedience to the nation should be derived from the standpoint of true religious self-awareness. Mere seeking one’s own peace of mind is selfish’
(Nishida Kitarō, ‘Towardss a Philosophy of Religion with the Concept of Pre-Established
Harmony as Guide’, translated by David A. Dilworth, Eastern Buddhist, New Series 2, 1,
1970, p. 45). Even more significant, Nishida—borrowing a line from Kegon Buddhism—
emphasized the importance of ‘See[ing] the universal in the particular thing.’ This notion
may be fairly innocuous in itself, but Nishida situated it in concrete terms by locating the
universal principle in the particular locus called the Tennō 45—the Japanese emperor.
203
Ives, ‘Ethical Pitfalls’, p. 25. It should be noted that, particularly in his personal letters, Nishida feels some obvious discomfort as to the way ultranationalism was sweeping the country in the 1930s and 1940s. Some commentators have suggested that, in
fact, Nishida was mimicking the language of the militarists in order to bring it up from
the concrete reality of war and into some higher philosophico-religious sphere. This is
not a very strong claim, even when coupled with the fact that Nishida did come under
suspicion by some rightists for some of his moderate writings.
204
Kitamori Kazuo Z[\], quoted in Jan Van Bragt, ‘Kyoto Philosophy—Intrinsically
Nationalistic?’ in Rude Awakenings, p. 252.
205
Van Bragt, ‘Kyoto Philosophy’, p. 253. Van Bragt adds: ‘I do not wish to challenge
the value, the incalculable value, of such a standpoint for religion—provided that it
opens a path back to a heightened awareness of the actual contradictions, beautiful
or tragic as they may be, provided that it elaborates this path in sufficient detail to
constitute a norm for our imperfect attempts at being fully human.’ For Heisig, ‘the
consequences of [Nishida’s] position come to this: the non-I that emerges from the selfawareness of absolute nothingness looks for all the world to be a highly cultivated form
of ataraxia, a self-transcendence of which the highest good consists of its inability to be
moved by either good or evil’. See James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An
Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), p. 86.
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Conclusion: Legacy of Aesthetic Modernism
Despite the relatively liberal cultural and intellectual climate of the
period which later came to be known (rather wistfully) as ‘Taishō
democracy’, the first decades of the twentieth century saw increased
resistance on the part of nationalistic groups to the incursion of foreign
ideas and values. Though there remained a stalwart few who attempted
to construct a more moderate and even progressive model for modern
Japan, by the late 1930s even these moderate voices were lost amid the
rising tide of nationalism.206 Far from being a fringe movement, this
intellectual turn between early Taishō and early Shōwa—from cosmopolitanism to what has been called ‘culturalism’ (bunkashugi `c¡
¢)—is reflected in the writings of mainstream intellectuals, writers,
political and religious leaders.207 Among other things, within this intellectual trend we see a highly Romantic spirit; not least in the contrast
between culture (meaning creative self-realization, depth of spirit, and
aesthetic value) vs. civilization (meaning the rational, material, pragmatic, but ultimately spiritually vacuous wisdom of the modern industrial West). In addition to the obvious echoes of Ferdinand Tönnies’s
classic distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, this turn
away from civilization, ethics and politics towards culture and aesthetics reflects what Marxist critic Tōsaka Jun ^_` (1900–1945) referred
to as a widespread move among Taishō and early Shōwa intellectuals
from ‘political’ to ‘cultural liberalism’. According to Tōsaka:
[As t]he very meaning of such liberalism is literary, it must be a liberalism
that is decisively cut off from liberalism in the sense of political actions
(which would necessarily lead to the pursuit of democracy). Even in its
political aspect, it is here nothing more than liberalism as a literary concept, one that utterly transcends politics. . . . Now surprisingly enough,
such literary liberalism contains a path that runs through fascism.208
206
‘Many believed that by realizing the best of East and West, Japan had achieved a
new cosmopolitan culture. The recognition of having achieved this unprecedented synthesis validated the subsequent belief that Japan was uniquely qualified to assume leadership in Asia, although much of the rhetoric that writers used referred to the world at
large’ (Najita and Harootunian, ‘Japan’s Revolt’, p. 208).
207
‘Whereas an earlier cosmopolitanism promoted the ideal of cultural diversity
and equivalence based on the principle of a common humanity, which served also to
restrain excessive claims to exceptionalism, the new culturalism of the 1930s proposed
that Japan was appointed to lead the world to a higher level of cultural synthesis that
surpassed Western modernism itself ’ (Najita and Harootunian, ‘Japan’s Revolt’, p. 208).
208
Tosaka Jun, quoted in Karatani Kōjin, ‘Overcoming Modernity’, in Contemporary
Japanese Thought, edited by Richard F. Calichman, pp. 101–118 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005).
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Modern interpretations of Buddhism—and Zen in particular—
continue to reflect this mindset, developed in large part by thinkers
such as Nishida and D. T. Suzuki.209 Although we cannot simply dismiss
this interpretation of Buddhism as false, it is imperative to recogonize
its manifest hybridity, with sources that lie as deep within modernist
conceptions as within traditional Buddhist teachings.210 Moreover, it is
also important to recognize the variations in modernist interpretations
of Japanese Buddhism. While the aesthetic or existentialist interpretation of Buddhism has come to dominate postwar understandings of
Japanese Buddhist thought, it is in fact only one of the various forms
of Japanese Buddhist modernism to flourish in the late Meiji through
early Shōwa periods. Others, such as the New Buddhist movements
discussed above, show a quite distinctive but equally fertile combination of modernist currents with Buddhist thought and practice.

209
Robert Sharf, one of the more astute and critical contemporary scholars of Asian
Buddhism, argues that modern Zen as developed in the various writings of Zen-influenced
philosophers like Nishida and Suzuki came to be conceived as a ‘mystical or spiritual gnosis
that transcends sectarian boundaries’ (Sharf, ‘Whose Zen?’, p. 43). Such an understanding
of Zen, Sharf argues, is quite distinct from anything preceding the Meiji period, and vastly
different from what goes on in the regular Zen monastery to this day. Stuart Lachs makes
the same point, suggesting that Suzuki in particular ‘promoted a non-traditional, modernist interpretation of Zen’ by emphasizing a Zen ‘freed from its Mahayana Buddhist context,
centred on a special kind of ‘pure’ experience and without the traditional Buddhist concern
for morality’. This view, according to Lachs, was taken up by the Kyoto School in an attempt
to accentuate the aspects of Buddhism ‘that are both most different from Western traditions
and most distinctively Japanese’—an ironic twist, given that it is largely the modernist element of such an interpretation of Zen that has attracted so many Western Buddhists of the
past several generations. ‘This view has fostered in the West a widespread conception of Zen
Buddhism as a tradition of exclusively cognitive import, inordinately preoccupied with the
ideas of Sunyata, non-duality, and absolute nothingness but with little talk of karma, Marga
(the path), compassion, or even the ‘marvelous qualities’ of Buddhahood. Such a view fails
to give adequate attention to the positive disciplines, including morality, that comprised
the lives of Buddhists, and easily leads one to think that Buddhists are unable to treat the
ordinary world of human activity seriously.’ See Stuart Lachs, ‘Coming Down from the Zen
Clouds: A Critique of the Current State of American Zen’, web article: <http://www.geocities.com/jiji_muge/uszen3.html>, p. 1.
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In a recent book entitled The Making of Buddhist Modernism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), David McMahan has traced many of these sources. While Buddhist Modernism is invaluable in presenting a nuanced overview of the construction of
Buddhist modernism in the West, as the author himself notes, there is much more work
to be done in terms of uncovering the specifics, as well as the variations, of Buddhist
modernism as it developed in Asian contexts.

